Darwinism, war and history: the debate over the biology of war from the `Origin of species' to the First World War by La Vergata, Antonello
Book Reviews
Paul Crook, Darwinism, war and history:
the debate over the biology ofwarfrom the
'Origin ofspecies' to the First World War,
Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. xii,
306, £45.00, $64.95 (hardback 0-521-44465-9),
£18.95, $27.95 (paperback 0-5214 6645-8).
This important book traces "the manifold
implications of Darwin's theories for the
debate over war and peace" (p. 192) up to the
end of the First World War. It is generally
believed that Darwinism was used to legitimize
conflict and aggression, within society as well
as between societies, and the beneficent effects
of war-as a form of the struggle for life-on
the quality ofthe race. But the author
emphasizes "the cultural malleability of
Darwinism" (p. 31), which could be
accommodated to a surprising diversity of
users. "In the debate over the 'biology ofwar',
as more generally, Darwinism bred a myriad of
diverse doctrines, a plurality of connotations.
Complex interactions took place between
biological and social domains. Biological
theories took on different ideological shadings
in differing historical climates" (p. 97). The
same theory (but we might well wonder if it
was really the same) was appealed to in
support ofopposed ideologies. Although many
pacifists opposed biological determinism, they
used biological arguments and analogies no
less than their adversaries did. Professor Crook
stresses the historical importance of what he
calls "the discourse ofpeace biology", which
grew out of a co-operationist interpretation of
Darwin's holistic ecology. It was a strong and
multi-faceted tradition, "always adaptive and
resilient" (p. 153), which, unlike biological
militarism, owed its persistence to its
congruency with entrenched moral culture.
However, peace apostles did not hesitate to
appeal to the verdict ofbiology when this
suited their case. For peace biology itself was
not immune from contradictions and from
blending facts and values. Nor was it a
monolith. It was often a liberal movement, but
not always or necessarily so: Crook succeeds
brilliantly in showing that it could be coupled
with racism or a defence ofcapitalism, elitism
and middle-class isolationism. It was torn by a
tension between a "naturalistic pacifism" and
a "methodological disquiet about biological
determinism" (p. 62). There was a gulf, the
author rightly says, between the free will and
optimistic pacifism of those who asserted the
primacy ofculture in the modem evolution of
man and that ofthe pessimistic and determinist
eugenicists who found war was dysgenic
precisely because it had become modernized
and industrialized. The "submerged
ambivalences and discursive tensions" (p. 153)
in peace biology are best illustrated in the
author's treatment of the eugenicists' attitude
to war.
It is the book's greatest merit to show that
there were tensions, contradictions and
ambiguities in every strand of opinion, whether
the "multivalence of crowd theories" (p. 152)
or the ambiguous ideological implications of
Mendelism (p. 75), the tensions in economic
pacifist literature (p. 103), or the discordances
in the doctrines of man's innate aggressiveness,
or the frequent confusion between Darwinism
and Lamarckism. Pseudo-biology featured on
both sides of the propaganda war. The book
shows that there is a "perennial interaction
between science and social theory" (p. 174). It
ends with an even-handed and perceptive
discussion of social Darwinism.
Paradoxical though it may seem, the main
criticism that can be levelled against this book
addresses one of its merits: the lack of
comparison with countries outside the English-
speaking world. It was a necessary condition
for the success of the research that its scope
should be restricted in some way. Confining it
to English sources has ensured unity and
completeness oftreatment, and has enabled the
author to marshall a host of books and articles
and deal concisely with an enormous number
of authors (and, what is more, not all as well-
known as Charles Darwin or Herbert Spencer),
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but it has also involved a narrowing ofthe
perspective. Few subjects more certainly
demand an international perspective than war.
To mention only a couple offacts that support
this remark, let me remind the reader that: (1)
as the aggressive interpretation ofDarwinism
was often presented as a typical German craze,
something more should have been said on
Germany at least; (2) there were national
differences between the schools of social
psychology, as crowds were obviously seen
differently in different contexts (and the author
himself recognizes that "the politico-cultural
context was critical", p. 152).
But these are not so much strictures on this
very important book as appeals for a sequel to
it. The author seems to be the right person to
give his creature a companion (but he must
find a copy-editor who really cares about the
proper spelling offoreign names and words).
Antonello La Vergata, University ofBologna
Andre Pichot, Histoire de la notion de vie,
Paris, Gallimard, 1993, pp. 973, FF 89.00
(2-07-073136-7).
This is a formidable volume, both physically
and intellectually. Its nearly 1,000 pages of
closely printed text are unrelieved by
illustrations, and the book as a whole has the
weight and dimensions ofthe average house
brick. But for the reader who is willing to take
on the task ofstudying a work ofthis
magnitude and density, the rewards are
significant.
Pichot's approach to the history oftheories
of life is highly philosophical and would not
suit the more sociologically minded historian.
But within its chosen framework it presents a
sweeping and in places highly original analysis
of attempts to answer the question, "What is
life?", throughout the period from antiquity to
the present. The discussion is organized
chronologically, with chapters devoted to
major authors, or to groups of authors related
in time and outlook.
Pichot's epistemological analysis is
interspersed with extensive passages taken
from these authors, with about a third ofthe
text overall being comprised ofthese well-
chosen illustrative extracts. What we have,
then, is not only a sustained argument from
Pichot but also a valuable anthology ofrelated
primary materials (translated into French where
this is not the original language).
It is impossible in a briefreview to do
justice to the complexity of Pichot's argument,
but one ofhis central concerns is to examine
historical material in a way that will provide
the critical tools needed to assist modern
biology in developing its own scientifically
adequate concept ofthe specificity oflife. This
aim leads Pichot to treat familiar historical
figures such as Aristotle, Rene Descartes and
Jean-Baptiste Lamarck in unfamiliar ways.
That these three individuals are in fact central
to Pichot's account, is clear from the titles he
gives to his first seven chapters: 'Before
Aristotle', 'Aristotle and life', 'After Aristotle',
'Before Descartes', 'Descartes and mechanism',
'After Descartes', 'Lamarck and biology'.
Ofthese three central figures, it is Aristotle
and Lamarck who emerge as the most
important contributors to the conceptualization
of life-Aristotle operating within an idealist
metaphysic ofeternal and unchanging forms
and Lamarck within a materialist metaphysic
oftime-dependent progressions. From this
perspective Galen's work represents a retreat
from the comprehensiveness ofAristotle's
concept oflife, with the Galenic
"parcellisation" ofthe body into quasi-
autonomous organs and "faculties"
undermining the integrity of the Aristotelian
psyche. Indeed, for Pichot, Galen's notion of
the functioning of organs is already machine-
like, despite all its vaunted teleology; for, as
Georges Canguilhem pointed out long ago,
nothing is more teleological than a machine.
Descartes, typically seen as the founder of
the mechanistic view oflife, is presented by
Pichot as being for the most part a mere
translator ofGalen's physiology into a different
idiom, one that Pichot characterizes as
"machine-ism" rather than genuine mechanism.
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